Set/reset (Martin, 1986) hypothesis that contrast demands more cognitive effort than does assimilation was examined. In Exp. 1, the impressions of distracted Ss showed assimilation toward blatantly primed concepts, whereas the impressions of nondistracted Ss showed contrast. In Exp. 2, Ss told that their ratings would be lumped into a group average showed assimilation, whereas Ss told that their ratings would be examined individually showed contrast. In Exp. 3, the impressions of Ss low in need for cognition showed assimilation, whereas the impressions of Ss high in need for cognition showed contrast. Exp. 1 also showed that the results were not due to differences in recall of the target information, and Exp. 3 showed that the results were not due to differences in recall of the priming stimuli. Together, the results suggest that the processes involved in contrast demand more cognitive effort than do the processes involved in assimilation.
The context in which a stimulus is embedded can have significant effects on people's judgment of that stimulus. The two effects that have been most reliably demonstrated are assimilation and contrast. Assimilation refers to a positive relation between the value people place on a target stimulus and the value they place on the contextual stimuli that accompany the target. Contrast refers to a negative relation between these two values (cf. Sherman, Ahlm, Berman, & Lynn, 1978) . The terms assimilation and contrast are generic in the sense that they refer simply to the direction of context effects, and not to the processes underlying them. It is not unreasonable to assume, therefore, that there are different kinds of assimilation and contrast that involve different kinds of processes (cf. Wedell, in press ).
The factor most frequently considered in the explanation of assimilation and contrast is the distribution of the contextual stimuli (Helson, 1964; Manis, Nelson, & Shedler, 1988; Parducci, 1965; Upshaw & Ostrom, 1984) . The typical finding is that individuals rate stimuli of moderate value lower on the dimension of judgment (e.g, height, weight, or degree of persistence) if they have previously rated stimuli high on that dimension than if they have previously rated stimuli low on that dimension. As an example, a moderately tall person might be rated as short by subjects who have just rated a very tall person, but as tall by subjects who have just rated a very short person. This would be a contrast effect.
The effects of the distribution of contextual stimuli can be moderated, however, by several factors. For example, rating of a target of ambiguous value tends to show contrast only when
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Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Leonard L. Martin, Department of Psychology, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602. that rating is made in the context of stimuli that are very extreme on the dimension of judgment. When ambiguous stimuli are rated in the context of moderately extreme stimuli, assimilation may occur. As an example, an animal of ambiguous size (e.g., a fictional animal) would be rated as relatively large by subjects who have previously rated the size of a horse but would be rated as relatively small by subjects who have previously rated the size of a whale (Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983) .
The effects of contextual stimuli can also be moderated by the number of categories with which subjects are presented to record their judgments. In general, the effects of the contextual stimuli decrease as the number of available categories increases (e.g, Wedell & Parducci, 1988) . Finally, the magnitude of contextual effects may depend on how the stimuli are presented. Assimilation may be more likely when the target and contextual stimuli are presented simultaneously, whereas contrast may be more likely when they are presented successively (Martin & Seta, 1983; Wedell, Parducci, & Geiselman, 1987) .
Decisions in the Use of Contextual Information
In recent years, a number of researchers (e.g, Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, 1987; Martin, 1986; Newman & Uleman, 1990; Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kubler, & Wanke, 1989) have been finding evidence of both assimilation and contrast under conditions in which none of the factors just described are manipulated. Martin (1986, Experiment 3) , for example, presented subjects with a series of either positive or negative self-referent statements and asked them to write another sentence in their own words that communicated the same meaning as the printed statement. Some subjects were given eight statements to reflect, whereas others were given four. All subjects were allowed to reflect four statements and then were asked to put that task aside and begin a different task. This means that subjects who had been asked to reflect four statements had finished the reflection task, whereas subjects who had been asked to reflect eight statements were only halfway through that task.
Following the interruption or completion of the reflection task, subjects were asked to form an impression of a target person described in terms that were ambiguous with respect to their favorableness. These impressions were assimilated toward the implications of the primed concepts when subjects had been interrupted but were contrasted with those implications when subjects had been allowed to complete the priming task. Martin (1986) explained these results in terms of the set/reset model. This model is based on the assumption that when individuals take seriously the goal of forming an impression, they attempt to assess their own genuine reaction to the target person. If they find themselves thinking negative thoughts because of their exposure to negative contextual stimuli, for example, then they avoid these thoughts in forming their impression. Such thoughts are not their genuine reaction to the target. What they do instead is partial out this contextual influence and attempt to assess their own context-independent reaction to the target person. The partialingout of reactions deemed inappropriate to a judgment is called resetting.
According to Martin (1986) , resetting may lead to contrast, as depicted schematically in Figure 1 . The circle in Panel A depicts a hypothetical reaction to a target person described in terms ambiguous with respect to their favorableness. The reaction has both positive and negative features. In Panel B, the effects of priming subjects with a positive concept are shown as an overlapping circle on the positive component of the ambiguous reaction (e.g, priming the concept "adventurous" for subjects forming an impression of an adventurous-reckless person). Because of the close overlap, subjects may not make a perfect discrimination between their reaction to the priming task and their reaction to the target. Thus, when they attempt to partial out their contextually induced reaction, they may inadvertently partial out aspects of what otherwise would have been their genuine reaction to the target. That is, they may respond to the target predominantly in terms of the target's context-distinct features (see Panel C). According to Martin (1986) , this context-distinct residual is then used as a set of probe cues to access a new concept with which the individuals interpret the target information. Thus, there is a contrast effect on the subjects' interpretations of the target information (reset contrast).
Because reset contrast involves the suppressed use of the primed concepts, subjects would be more likely to successfully reset when they are not motivated to continue thinking about the primed concepts. The purpose of the interruption/completion manipulation in the Martin (1986) study was to systematically vary the subjects' tendencies to perseverate on the primed concepts. Research has shown that individuals are more likely to continue thinking about tasks they have not completed than tasks they have completed (Marrow, 1938; Martin & Tesser, 1989; Zeigarnik, 1927 Zeigarnik, /1938 . Thus, subjects in the interruptedtask conditions should be more likely than those in the completed-task conditions to perseverate about the priming task during the subsequent formation of their target impression. As a result, they would find it difficult to reset. The end result is that subjects in the interrupted-task condition are more likely than those in the completed-task condition to use the primed concepts in forming their impressions.
These findings are difficult to explain in terms of the models of context effects described earlier (e.g, Helson, 1964; Parducci, 1965; Upshaw & Ostrom, 1984) . None of the factors considered critical in those models was manipulated. Subjects were exposed to the same priming stimuli (within the negative and positive conditions) and the same target information in the same sequence, and they indicated their impressions on the same kinds of response scales. The only difference between the conditions that produced assimilation and those that produced contrast was whether the priming task was interrupted or completed. According to Martin (1986) , the blatant nature of the priming task caused subjects to attempt to partial out the primed concept from their impression of the target. Subjects who had completed the priming task were successful in their attempts, whereas subjects who were interrupted during the priming task were not.
It should be noted that not all instances in which subjects partial out a contextually induced reaction are a function of their desire to assess their context-independent reaction to the target. As Strack, Martin, and Schwarz (1988) showed, a subject's adherence to the maxims of communication (e.g, H. H. Clark, 1985; Grice, 1975) may produce conceptually similar results. Having just answered a question about their happiness with their dating life, for example, subjects can assume that the questioner has the information he or she asked for with regard to that topic. Consequently, when they immediately encounter a question about their happiness with life as a whole, subjects may interpret this question as a request for information about aspects of their lives other than dating (e.g, school, health, and family). Consequently, they may partial out their happiness with their dating life from their happiness with life in general.
Taken together, the results of Martin (1986) and Strack et al. (1988) suggest that individuals will partial out contextually primed information (e.g, concepts or previous answers) if use of that information appears inappropriate to their current processing objectives. One cannot give his or her own spontaneous reaction to the target by knowingly responding in terms of a contextually primed concept. Nor can one give new information by responding with previously given information.
Contrast and Cognitive Effort
One implication of the set/reset view of contrast is that contrast involves more cognitive steps than does assimilation. With reset contrast, subjects avoid the use of the primed concept and search for another concept that matches the implications of the target information. With assimilation, on the other hand, subjects merely use the primed concept to interpret the target information. This difference implies that reset contrast demands the expenditure of more cognitive effort than does assimilation. If this is true, then limiting the amount of cognitive effort subjects are willing or able to put forth in forming an impression should undermine their ability to achieve reset contrast. With limited cognitive resources, subjects should default to the less effortful option of using the most accessible, applicable concept (cf. Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Martin & Harlow, in press) . A schematic representation of the set/reset model is contained in Figure 2 .
We report on three experiments that explored the role of cognitive effort in the occurrence of reset contrast. If reset contrast really does demand more cognitive effort than does assimilation, then under conditions that ordinarily result in contrast when subjects are not distracted, there should be assimilation when they are distracted. We tested this hypothesis in Experiment 1.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, subjects engaged in a pencil-and-paper task that blatantly primed either positive or negative concepts (see Martin, 1986 , Experiment 3). Then, they formed an impression of a person whose actions could be construed in either positive or negative terms. Because of the blatant nature of the priming task, we expected subjects to be predisposed toward forming impressions that were inconsistent with the implications of the primed concepts. That is, they would be predisposed toward contrast (see Lombardi et al, 1987; Martin, 1986; Newman & Uleman, 1990; Strack et al, 1989) . If the cognitive effort hypothesis is correct, however, then this contrast effect may be modified by the amount of cognitive effort subjects exert while forming their impression.
To test for this, we asked half of the subjects in each priming condition (positive vs. negative) simply to form an impression, but we asked the remaining subjects to listen to a tape recording while forming their impressions. On the recording, a male If contrast demands more cognitive effort than does assimilation, then subjects' impressions should be contrasted with the implications of the primed concepts when subjects are not distracted but should be assimilated toward those implications when subjects are distracted.
Method
Subjects and design. Forty-six men and women were recruited from introductory psychology classes at the University of Georgia. These subjects were given partial course credit in return for their participation. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 X 2 design. The four conditions were as follows: (a) primed with a positive concept, no distractor; (b) primed with a negative concept, no distractor; (c) primed with a positive concept, distractor; and (d) primed with a negative concept, distractor. There were approximately equal numbers of subjects in each cell and the ratio of men to women in each cell was about equal.
Procedure. The procedure was similar to that used by Martin (1986) . Subjects were brought to the laboratory in groups of 4 to 6 and were seated individually at desks. They were assigned to either the positive or the negative priming condition through the counterba- 
Note
. Subjects' open-ended descriptions were coded for favorableness on a 7-point scale. The higher the value, the more favorable the impression. Logical comparisons that do not share a common subscript differ at p < .05.
lanced distribution of stimulus booklets. The level of distraction was varied between experimental sessions. The booklet for the first task was composed of four pages on which self-referent positive or negative statements were listed (see Martin, 1985) . Subjects were told that these statements were part of a "social empathy task" and that the ostensible purpose of the task was to see how well the subjects could match their feelings with those of another person. For each of the four statements in the booklet, subjects were to write, in their own words, a sentence that captured the same feeling as the printed statement. This task has been shown to be effective in producing contrast effects (see Martin, 1986 , Experiment 3). The subjects were paced through this task one statement at a time. When they had completed the last statement, they were told to place their booklets face down on their desks.
The experimenter then gave subjects the instructions for the impression-formation task. In the no-distractor conditions, subjects were instructed simply to read the description and to form an impression of the person described. Subjects in the distractor conditions, on the other hand, were told that the experimenter was examining the effects of distraction on people's ability to form impressions-"the kind of thing that might happen if you met a person for the first time at a loud, crowded party." The experimenter then explained that to test for this, a tape recording would be played while the subjects were trying to form their impressions. In the recording, a male voice was reciting a random string of digits and letters. The subjects were told to keep track mentally of the number of digits spoken. They were instructed to pay equal attention to the impression-formation task and the digit-counting task. In both the distractor and the no-distractor conditions, subjects were given Vh min to read the description of the stimulus person. When this time had elapsed, the recorder was turned off in the distraction conditions, and the experimenter asked the subjects in all conditions to turn to the next page of the stimulus booklets.
On the next page of the booklet, subjects were asked to describe the target person in their own words. Subjects were given 3 min for this task. When all subjects had finished this task, they turned to the next page of the booklet, where they were asked to recall everything they could about the target person. They were asked to be as complete and accurate as possible and to recall the description in its original wording. Subjects were given 3 min for this task. When the recall task was completed, subjects were debriefed and excused from the experiment.
Results and Discussion
Subjects' open-ended descriptions were presented to two research assistants blind to the conditions under which the descriptions were written. These assistants rated each description on a 7-point scale ranging from very negative (1) to very positive (7). These ratings (interrater reliability = .79) were averaged and submitted to a 2 (positive prime vs. negative prime X 2 (distractor vs. no distractor) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA).
The ANOVA revealed only one significant effect, an interaction between the valence of the priming stimuli and the presence-absence of distraction, F{\, 42) = 11.76, p < .005. This interaction was decomposed through the use of planned comparisons (see Table 1 ). These comparisons indicated that subjects who had been distracted while forming their impressions formed more favorable impressions following priming with a positive concept (M = 4.7) than following priming with a negative concept (M = 2.7). Subjects who had not been distracted formed less favorable impressions following priming with a positive concept (M = 2.5) compared to a negative concept (M = 3.3). In short, there was assimilation when subjects were distracted and contrast when they were not distracted. These results support the set/reset hypothesis prediction that the processes involved in contrast demand more cognitive effort than do the processes involved in assimilation.
The subjects' exact recall of the target paragraph was also analyzed (see Table 2 ). This was done to assess an alternate interpretation of our data. It is possible that subjects distracted while reading the target description retained less of the target information than did nondistracted subjects. If so, then these subjects may have been more influenced by the primed concepts than the nondistracted subjects simply because they had less target information on which to base their judgments (cf. Herr et al, 1983) . If this interpretation is correct, then our results tell us little about the role of cognitive effort in assimilation and contrast.
To assess this alternate hypothesis, two assistants counted the number of events the subjects correctly recalled. These assistants were blind to the conditions from which the subjects' recall protocols came. A response was counted as correct only if it referred to a specific event or personality characteristic in the description. For example, "climbed a mountain" would be counted as a hit, but "does wild things" would not. The codings (interrater reliability = .95) were averaged to form a single composite of each subjects' recall and submitted to an ANOVA. This ANOVA revealed that subjects who were distracted recalled slightly less information about the target (M= 3.6) than did subjects who were not distracted (M= 4.5), but this difference was not significant, F(l, 42) = 1.38. There was also no significant effect of prime on recall, F(l, 43) = 1.06, nor was there a significant interaction between prime and distractor, Moreover, when the recall scores were entered as a covariate into the analysis of subjects' impressions, they did not significantly alter the results compared to when no covariate was used (covariate: F < 1). Thus, the results of Experiment 1 appear to be due to differences in the way subjects processed the information they had rather than to differences in the information they had to process.
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the hypothesis that reset contrast demands more cognitive effort than does assimilation. If a mental process is truly effortful, however, then to perform that process, people must not only have a sufficient amount of cognitive capacity available but also be willing to use it. In Experiment 2, we held constant the amount of capacity subjects had available, but we manipulated their willingness to use that capacity.
As in Experiment 1, subjects were primed with either positive or negative concepts and were asked to form an impression of a person described in terms that were ambiguous as to their favorableness. Subjects were run in small groups (e.g, 5 to 7), and most of the subjects in each group were told to put no name or any other identifying mark on their papers. They were told that their ratings would be averaged with those of the other members of their group and that the experimenter was interested only in the overall group response. The 1 or 2 remaining subjects (depending on the size of the group) were asked to put their names on their stimulus booklets and were told that the experimenters were concerned with their personal responses.
Research on social loafing has shown that individuals who are engaged in a group task in which their individual contributions cannot be identified exert less cognitive effort than do individuals whose outputs can be identified (Petty, Harkins, & Williams, 1980; Petty, Harkins, Williams, & Latane, 1977). On the basis of this research, we hypothesized that subjects who were told that their responses would be examined individually would exert more effort in forming their impression than would subjects told that their responses would be lumped into a group average. So, if contrast really does demand more processing capacity than does assimilation, then impressions formed by individually identified subjects should show contrast, whereas those formed by the unidentified, grouped subjects should show assimilation.
Method
Subjects. Sixty-two men and women were recruited from introductory psychology classes at the University of Georgia. These subjects were given partial course credit in return for their participation. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 X 2 design. The conditions were as follows: (a) identified individuals primed with a positive concept, (b) identified individuals primed with a negative concept, (c) unidentified group members primed with a positive concept, and (d) unidentified group members primed with a negative concept. There were approximately equal numbers of subjects in each cell, and the ratio of men to women in each cell was about equal.
Procedure. Subjects were brought to the laboratory in groups ranging from 5 to 7. The subjects were seated individually at desks and handed two stimulus packets. The first packet contained the priming materials, and the second contained the target paragraph and the scales on which subjects were asked to indicate their impressions. The priming materials and the target paragraph were the same as those used in Experiment 1.
Subjects were run in groups varying in size from S to 7. The experimenter randomly selected 4 or 5 in each group and stressed to these people that they were to put no name or any other identifying mark on their papers. It was emphasized that their ratings would be averaged with those of the other members of their group and that the experimenter was interested only in the overall group response. The 1 or 2 remaining subjects were asked to put their names on their stimulus booklets and were told that the experimenter wished to compare their individual responses with the group average.
Subjects then read the description of the target person and indicated their impressions of this person by responding to four 9-point scales. These scales were bounded by bipolar trait adjectives that were applicable for construing the actions in the target description. These adjectives were adventurous-reckless, conceited-stubborn, aloof-independent, and stubborn-persistent. After subjects had indicated their impression on these scales, they were debriefed and excused from the experiment.
Results and Discussion
It is typical in social loafing research to use the scores of single individuals led to believe either that they are working in a group or that they are working alone. We felt, however, that the social loafing manipulation would be more effective if subjects actually performed in the group. We made sure that no experimental session yielded more than one score for any of the four conditions by averaging the scores of the grouped subjects (2-3) in each session. In other words, the scores of subjects identified as individuals were entered into the analysis as separate data points, whereas the scores of subjects run as a group were averaged to yield a single score for each priming condition (positive and negative) for each experimental session. Although the averaging of scores may make the scores in the grouped condition more stable than those in the individual condition, it does not affect the direction of the effects. Consequently, this averaging does not represent a biased test of our hypothesis.
The data were submitted to a 2 (valence of prime) X 2 (individual vs. group) X 4 (rating dimension) repeated measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed a significant main effect for rating dimension, F(3,117)= 5.53, p < .001, which indicated that, as a group, subjects rated the target person less favorably on the stubborn-persistent dimension than on any of the other dimensions. It also revealed a significant Rating X IndividualGroup interaction, F(3,117)= 3.08, p < .03. This interaction occurred because subjects who were isolated as individuals rated the target more favorably on the conceited-self-confident dimension than did subjects who were told they were part of a group.
Theoretically more interesting, however, was the significant interaction between the valence of the priming stimuli and the individual-group manipulation, F(l, 39) = 7.36, p < .01. This interaction was decomposed through the use of planned comparisons (see Table 3 ). These comparisons revealed that the unidentified group subjects rated the target person as significantly more favorable following priming with a positive concept (M= 6.7) than following priming with a negative concept (M= Note. Subjects' ratings were made on 9-point scales. The higher the value, the more favorable the impression. Logical comparisons that do not share a common subscript differ at p < .05.
5.4). The individually identified subjects, on the other hand, rated the target person as significantly less favorable following priming with a positive concept (M = 6.2) compared to a negative concept (M = 1.1). In short, there was assimilation in conditions in which subjects have been shown in past research (Petty et al, 1980; Petty et al, 1977) to exert little cognitive effort (unidentified grouped) and contrast in conditions in which subjects have been shown to exert more cognitive effort (individually identified). These results conceptually replicate those of Experiment 1 and provide additional support to the hypothesis that the processes associated with contrast demand more cognitive effort than do the processes associated with assimilation.
Experiment 3
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 are consistent with the notion that contrast demands more cognitive effort than does assimilation, but they do not provide unequivocal support for that hypothesis. The problem is that the manipulations of capacity used in those experiments may have inadvertently influenced another factor known to determine the occurrence of assimilation and contrast. Several studies (e.g, Lombardi et al, 1987; Newman & Uleman, 1990; Strack et al, 1989) have shown that subjects' impressions are likely to reflect contrast when subjects can recall any of the priming stimuli (even one) but are likely to reflect assimilation when subjects cannot recall any of these stimuli.
It is possible that the nondistracted subjects in Experiment 1 and the individually identified subjects of Experiment 2 remembered the priming stimuli, whereas the distracted and grouped subjects did not. If so, then we might expect that the distracted and grouped subjects would show assimilation, whereas the nondistracted and identified subjects would show contrast. This, in fact, was the obtained pattern of results.
If the results are due to differences in memory for the priming stimuli, then one could argue that we have little evidence that contrast demands more cognitive effort than does assimilation. It may be that memory of the priming stimuli changes the perceived similarity of the target to the priming stimuli (or some similar factor), and this, in turn, determines whether assimilation or contrast occurs (cf. Herr et al, 1983) .
We attempted to clarify this issue in Experiment 3 by using a manipulation of processing capacity that was unlikely to interfere with the subjects' recall of the priming stimuli. In addition, we assessed the subjects' recall of the priming stimuli to see whether it correlated with the occurrence of assimilation and contrast. We manipulated the subjects' tendencies to exert cognitive effort by blocking them on their need for cognition.
Need for cognition is an individual difference that reflects one's tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive processing (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) . Considerable evidence suggests that subjects high in need for cognition exert more effort on cognitive tasks than do subjects low in need for cognition (see Heesacker, 1985 , for a review). So, if contrast demands more cognitive effort than does assimilation, then the impressions of subjects high in need for cognition should show contrast, whereas the impressions of subjects low in need for cognition should show assimilation, and this should be true even if the level of prime recall is the same for both groups of subjects.
Method
Subjects. Fifty-two men and women were recruited from introductory psychology classes at the University of Georgia. These subjects were given partial course credit in return for their participation. Subjects either high or low in their need for cognition were randomly assigned to one of two priming conditions (positive vs. negative). There were an equal number of subjects in each cell, and the ratio of men to women in each cell was about equal.
Procedure. Subjects were run in groups ranging from 5 to 8. They were told that the experimenter was interested in examining how people form impressions of one another. The experimenter then distributed booklets containing the priming task and the impression formation task. The priming task was similar to that used in the earlier experiments except that in Experiment 3 subjects were primed with the concepts persistent and stubborn.
After all subjects had completed the priming task, the experimenter asked them to turn to the next page of their stimulus booklets and to form an impression of the person described on that page. The description was ambiguous in terms of how stubborn or persistent the target was. When subjects felt they had read the description to their satisfaction, they turned to the next page of the booklet and indicated their impressions on four rating scales. These were 7-point scales bound by the following adjectives: inflexible-flexible, nosy-curious, stingythrifty, and conceited-self-confident.
When all subjects had completed their ratings, they were asked to turn to the last page of the stimulus booklet and write down as many of the traits and behaviors as they could remember from the priming task. They were given 5 min for this task. Following the recall task, the stimulus packets were taken up, and the need-for-cognition inventories Note. Subjects' ratings were made on 7-point scales. The higher the value, the more favorable the impression. Logical comparisons that do not share a common subscript differ at p < .05. (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) . After filling out the inventories, subjects were debriefed and excused.
Results and Discussion
There is no absolute criterion by which individuals can be classified as high or low in need for cognition (Heesacker, 1985) . Therefore, we blocked subjects on need for cognition using the highest and lowest one third of our sample. The ratings from these subjects were analyzed using a 2 (high vs. low need for cognition) X 2 (positive vs. negative prime) X 4 (rating dimension) repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis revealed two significant effects.
There was a main effect for rating dimension, FQ, 108) = 6.18, p < .009, indicating that subjects rated the stimulus person more favorably on the inflexible-flexible (M = 6.4) and the conceited-self-confident (M -6.4) dimensions than on the nosy-curious (M = 4.9) and the stingy-thrifty (M = 5.2) dimensions. Theoretically more interesting, however, was the significant interaction between valence of prime and level of need for cognition, F(l, 36) = 5.75, p < .02. This interaction was decomposed through the use of planned comparisons (see Table 4 ). These comparisons indicated that subjects low in need for cognition showed assimilation, whereas subjects high in need for cognition showed contrast. That is, subjects low in need for cognition formed more favorable impressions after being primed with positive concepts (M = 6.4) than after being primed with negative concepts (M = 5.2). Subjects high in need for cognition, on the other hand, formed more favorable impressions after being primed with negative concepts (M = 6.1) compared to positive concepts (M = 4.8).
Recall of the priming stimuli. To see if recall of the priming stimuli was accounting for the differences in our results, we attempted to correlate subjects' recall of the priming stimuli with their ratings (e.g, Lombardi et al, 1987) . In the process of coding the data, however, we found that all but 1 subject remembered the priming stimuli. More specifically, all but 1 subject recalled at least one of the primed-trait concepts and, on the average, 1.9 of the 8 behaviors they had to categorize (see Table 5 ). Thus, our results are not a function of whether subjects did or did not recall the priming stimuli. We then checked to see if amount of prime recall predicted subjects' tendencies to show assimilation as opposed to contrast. It did not. When the recall scores were submitted to an ANOV\, there were no significant differences between conditions, and when recall was used as a covariate in an analysis of subjects' impressions, it did not significantly alter the results obtained when no covariate was used (covariate: F(l, 35) = 1.4). In short, the tendency of our subjects to show assimilation or contrast in their impressions was not a function of their ability to recall the priming stimuli.
General Discussion
We began with the general question of whether the execution of a contrasted judgment demands more processing capacity than does the execution of an assimilated judgment. Our results suggest that it does (at least with reset contrast). In three conceptual replications, the impressions of subjects who exerted cognitive effort showed contrast, whereas the impressions of subjects who did not exert cognitive effort showed assimilation. Experiment 1 showed the effects of ability to exert cognitive effort, Experiment 2 showed the effects of willingness to exert cognitive effort, and Experiment 3 showed the effects of dispositional tendencies to exert cognitive effort.
In addition, Experiment 1 ruled out the possibility that the results were due to differences in the subjects' ability to recall the target information, and Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that the results were due to differences in the subjects' ability to recall the priming stimuli. Taken together, the results of all three experiments support the hypothesis that the processes involved in contrast demand more cognitive effort than do the processes involved in assimilation.
Mechanism for Assimilation and Contrast
It is important to note that in all three experiments, assimilation and contrast were obtained when subjects were exposed to the same contextual stimuli (within the positive and negative conditions) and the same target person in the same sequence, and they indicated their impressions in the same way (i.e, the same types of response scales or open-ended format). The only difference between the conditions that produced assimilation and those that produced contrast was the amount of cognitive effort the subjects exerted. Such a result is not readily explained in terms of theories that assume that assimilation and contrast are a function of factors such as the distribution of the contextual stimuli (Helson, 1964; Manis et al, 1988; Parducci, 1965; Upshaw & Ostrom, 1984) , the format in which the target and context stimuli are presented (Wedell et al, 1987) , the ambiguity of the target stimulus (Herr et al, 1983) , or the number of response categories available to the subjects (Wedell & Parducci, 1988) .
The results are also not readily explained by models that assume that assimilation and contrast arise from a common psychological mechanism. Sherif and Hovland (1961) , for example, proposed that both assimilation and contrast result from placement of the target stimulus in a category along the judgmental continuum. Assimilation occurs when the target stimulus falls within the same judgmental category as does the contextual stimuli, whereas contrast occurs when the target stimulus and the contextual stimuli fall into different categories. There is no reason from such a model why contrast should demand more cognitive effort than assimilation. Thus, their model (also, see Helson, 1964) cannot account for the present findings.
The present results are also difficult to explain in terms of the early models of concept priming effects (e.g, Higgins & King, 1981; Wyer & Srull, 1981) . These models had suggested that one's tendency to use a primed concept to interpret information isa function of the concept's accessibility and applicability. Accessibility refers to the concept's level of activation and is assumed to be a function of how recently or frequently a concept has been activated. Applicability refers to the descriptive match between the concept and the target information. In short, the early models assumed that as long as a concept had been recently or frequently activated and was applicable to the target information, individuals would use that concept to interpret the information.
This assumption was not supported in our experiments. In all three experiments, the primed concepts were both accessible and applicable. Yet, they were used to interpret the target information only when subjects did not exert cognitive effort. Clearly, factors in addition to accessibility and applicability can determine peopled use of concepts in forming impressions. Martin (1986) argued that, in addition to accessibility and applicability, factors in the general judgmental setting can prompt individuals into using or not using concepts. These factors include (a) the relation between the target and the context (Martin & Seta, 1983; Seta, Martin, & Capehart, 1979; Strack, Schwarz, & Gschneidinger, 1985) , (b) the desire to make a context-independent judgment (Kubovy, 1978; Martin, 1986) , (c) instructional sets (Leach, 1974) , and (d) communication rules (Strack et al, 1988) . These factors can be thought of as influencing one's estimate of the appropriateness of using contextually primed information (Higgins, 1989; Strack & Martin, 1987; Strack etal, 1988) .
Appropriateness and Information Use
In the present experiments, for example, one could say that individuals suppressed the use of the primed concepts and searched for another because use of the primed concepts would have been inappropriate. One cannot form one's own impression by knowingly using a concept primed by exposure to the contextual stimuli. One could do so unknowingly, however, as when the concept is primed very subtly (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Lombardi et al, 1987) .
A priming model incorporating assumptions similar to those of the set/reset model (Martin, 1986) was developed by Kubovy (1978) to explain how people generate a random number. By random, Kubovy (1978) meant a number that seems to the person to have arisen "entirely from natural impulse, without any external stimulus or constraint" (italics in original, Kubovy, 1978, p. 359) . He hypothesized that people first retrieve the number that comes most easily to mind (the accessibility step). Then, they check to see if the number appears random (the representativeness step). That is, they check to see whether the ease with which the number came to mind was caused by some external event. If the first number they retrieve appears random, then they give it as their response. If it does not appear random, then they search for one that does. When they find it, they give it as their response.
To test this hypothesis, Kubovy (1978) asked some subjects to "name the first digit that comes to mind." He noted that 2.2% of the subjects in this condition chose the digit 1. In a second condition, Kubovy increased the accessibility of the digit 1 by asking subjects to "name the first one digit number that comes to mind." Consistent with his accessibility assumption, Kubovy (1978) found that the percentage of subjects choosing 1 as their response increased to 18%.
In a third condition, Kubovy (1978) asked subjects to "name the first one digit number that comes to mind, like one." In this condition, the digit 1 is presumably highly accessible to subjects. It has just been mentioned twice. However, its accessibility is also clearly related to an external event, the experimenter's prompt. Thus, it is not representative of a random number. So, subjects should not give it as their response but instead should search for a number that seems more random (i.e, one not made accessible by the experimenter's prompt). Consistent with this two-step model, the number of subjects giving 1 as their response in this blatant priming condition decreased to 5.4%.
The commonality between Kubovy's (1978) model and the set/reset model (Martin, 1986 ) is that in both models individuals are assumed to engage in a judgment prior to using primed information. Both models imply that increasing the accessibility of information (e.g., a concept, a number, or a prior answer) is not a sufficient condition for increasing the use of that information. The present work extends both models by suggesting that the disuse of primed information demands more cognitive effort than does the use of that information.
Controlled Versus Conscious Processing
The present results (also, see Lombardi et al, 1987; Martin, 1986; Newman & Uleman, 1990; Strack et al, 1988; Strack et al, 1989) suggest that the passive nature of concept priming in impression formation may have been overemphasized by the early priming studies. Our results, however, should not be taken as evidence that the use and disuse of concepts in impression formation is a controlled process in the sense that it is open to introspective awareness. Research on automatic and controlled processes (for summaries see Bargh, 1989; Shiflrin, 1988; Uleman, 1989 ) has indicated that "virtually all complex and interesting processes of significant duration involve a mixture of automatic and control processes' (Shiffrin & Dumais, 1981, p. 112) . Thus, a process may be initiated without conscious intention yet still demand cognitive effort to continue.
It may be that stimulus conditions like those previously mentioned (i.e., blatant priming, communication rules) spontaneously activate a reset procedure that then runs to completion beyond the subjects' awareness (provided that subjects exert sufficient cognitive effort). Some indirect evidence for this assumption was obtained in our studies. During debriefing, our subjects tended to deny that the priming stimuli had any influence whatsoever on their ratings. They suggested instead that priming may have influenced the impressions of other subjects, but that they themselves had rated the target person as they did because they "really felt that he was that way" This leads us to believe that our subjects were aware of the priming stimuli and aware of their subsequent impression but were unaware of a relation between the two (cf. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) .
It is also important to note that the set/reset model (Martin, 1986) assumes that individuals make a judgment of inappropriateness, not a judgment of appropriateness (see Figure 2) . In other words, the model does not assume that people go around second guessing their use of each and every concept. Rather, they assess appropriateness only when some factor (eg., awareness of the priming episode) brings that issue to their attention (cf. Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Strack et al, 1989) . This may explain why assimilation, rather than contrast, tends to occur when individuals are not aware of being primed (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Lombardi et al, 1987; Newman & Uleman, 1990; Srull & Wyer, 1979) .
So, although awareness of the priming episode may generally bias people in the direction of a contrast (Lombardi et al, 1987; Newman & Uleman, 1990; Strack et al, 1989) , the present formulation suggests that it will lead individuals to a contrasted judgment only when (a) it prompts them to a decision of inappropriateness, and (b) they exert sufficient cognitive effort to partial out the inappropriate reaction from their reaction to the target (i.e, they reset).
Capacity and Correction
The present results bear at least a superficial resemblance to those obtained by Gilbert and his colleagues (see Gilbert, 1989 , for a review), who examined the role of cognitive capacity in people's use of situational information when making dispositional inferences. In one experiment, Gilbert et al. (1988, Experiment 1) showed subjects a videotape of a target person acting in a rather nervous fashion. Half of the subjects were told that the target was discussing anxiety-provoking topics. Half were told that she was discussing relaxing topics. All subjects rated the target in terms of how dispositionally anxious they considered her to be.
It was assumed that subjects would attribute the target's anxious behavior to the situation when she was portrayed as discussing anxiety-provoking topics but would attribute her behavior to dispositional nervousness when she was portrayed as discussing relaxing topics. The results were consistent with these assumptions-at least when the subjects were not distracted. When subjects were distracted while forming their impressions, there was no difference in their ratings of the target's dispositional anxiety. Gilbert etal. (1988) concluded that dispositional inferences occur relatively automatically, whereas corrections for situational constraints on behavior involve more controlled processing. Thus, when people are distracted and cannot exert sufficient cognitive effort, they do not correct for situational constraints on the behaviors of another person.
In our experiments, subjects were correcting for a situational influence on their own behaviors (i£, influence of a primed concept on their impressions of the target). These results, taken with those of Gilbert et al. (1988) , suggest that correcting for an initial evaluation demands more cognitive effort than does going with that initial evaluation. Of course, additional research is needed to see whether the mechanisms involved in these different phenomena are really similar to one another.
Interruption, Rumination, and Cognitive Effort
The present results may also have some implications for Martin's (1986) original interpretation of the set/reset findings. As noted earlier, Martin (1986) blatantly primed subjects with either positive or negative concepts and either interrupted them while they were performing the priming task or allowed them to complete that task. When subjects had been interrupted, their subsequent impressions were assimilated toward the implications of the primed concepts. When they had not been interrupted, their impressions were contrasted with the implications of the primed concepts. Martin (1986) proposed that with interruption subjects tended to ruminate about the primed concepts (Martin & Tesser, 1989; Zeigarnik, 1927 Zeigarnik, /1938 . Because of this rumination, it was difficult for them to suppress the primed concept and search for a context-distinct concept. With completion of the priming task, on the other hand, there was no rumination. Hence, resetting was easier.
The present results raise the possibility that the effect of interruption may not be as concept-specific as originally thought. It may be that the rumination produced by the interruption had its effect through the usurpation of general cognitive capacity. With lowered capacity, Martin's (1986) subjects, like those in the present experiments, could not reset. If this revised interpretation is correct, then it suggests that almost any sort of rumination (whether it be prime-related or not) following concept priming may undermine subjects' ability to achieve reset contrast.
Caveats
It is important to note that the manipulations of cognitive effort in our experiments occurred during the subjects' attempts to form an impression, not during their performance of the priming task. There is reason to believe that differences in the amount of cognitive effort expended during the priming task may have effects different from those reported in this article. In fact, increased effort during the priming task may lead to assimilation rather than to contrast (cf. L. F Clark & Collins, 1989; Strack etal, 1985) .
It should also be noted that our argument that contrast demands more cognitive effort than does assimilation may be limited to certain types of contrast effects-namely, those that result from differences in people's use of information (i.e, reset contrast). The same may not be true for other forms of contrast (Parducci & Wedell, 1986 ).
Summary and Implications
The present set of results suggests that the processes involved in reset contrast demand more cognitive effort than do the processes involved in assimilation. One reason for this may be that these forms of assimilation and contrast (i£, set and reset) arise from qualitatively distinct mechanisms. Assimilation may involve interpretation of the target information in terms of the contextually primed concept, whereas contrast may involve the suppressed use of the primed concept and the interpretation of the target information in terms of an alternate concept (Martin, 1986) . Future work could concentrate on other factors that lead to resetting (e.g, communication rules and relation of the target to the context) and on the processes that underlie it.
